By John Thomas
On October 7th 2023 Hamas terrorists attacked Israel near its border with the Gaza strip. The details of this attack have been widely publicised, so it is unnecessary to repeat them here. However, what is worth reiterating is that this attack flouted every tenet of ethical behaviour in armed conflict and deserves nothing but complete condemnation.
The effect on Israeli society was profound, but I do wonder whether we in the West appreciate just how profound the shock was – and still is.
The number of Israelis killed on October 7 is the equivalent (based on the total population of each country) of 3,000 killed in Australia, 9,000 in the UK and a staggering 37,000 in the USA, a figure which is over 15 times the number killed on 9/11. And unlike 9/11, the perpetrators of the 7 October attack took hundreds of hostages, introducing a new and awful dynamic to the situation.
It is inconceivable that any democratic government would not wish to retaliate to such a horrendous act, especially when the leadership of Hamas had reiterated its intention to wipe Israel from the map and to repeat the atrocity of 7 October, given the chance. So there is no question in my mind that Israel had a justified legal and ethical basis to react militarily.
The question remains open as to why Hamas would launch such a raid, knowing that Israel would be bound to react powerfully. Various theories are doing the rounds. For example, was this an attempt to sabotage a nascent positive relationship between Israel and Saudi Arabia, or was this an attempt to move the Palestinian question to the centre of the world stage? However, perhaps we should not seek further than an overpowering desire on Hamas’s part to wage jihad against Israel and its values.
And given that Israel has reacted with overwhelming force, the current debate centres less around whether Israel was justified in responding (ius ad bellum), which most observers believe it was, and much more around how it is prosecuting this campaign (ius in bello).
Inevitably, much of the focus of criticism has been on the actions of the IDF. That focus is understandable, as the personnel of the IDF are the ones pulling the triggers, firing the shells and flying the aircraft and drones. But the IDF does not act in a vacuum. It follows political guidance laid down by the Israeli cabinet.
We can be certain that the IDF is following the instructions laid down by its political masters. There will undoubtedly have been exchanges of view (quite probably robust) between the IDF senior commanders and the political leadership before and during the military operation. These exchanges will probably have been at their most acute when the operation commander sought guidance on his task.
In my experience, operation commanders do not like vague or ambiguous guidance. Israel’s strategic aims are well known – to destroy Hamas and to free the hostages. But I suggest that the operation commander needed something rather more specific. He would have needed clarity on what ‘destroying Hamas’ means. For example, was his remit to kill or
capture the Hamas leadership? Or to kill or capture middle ranking commanders or every male who was associated with Hamas, whether as a fighter or supporter?
And after his ‘What precisely do you want me to do?’ question will have come the next, crucial questions – ‘What are my rules of engagement?’. ‘What level of force am I authorised to use to achieve the aim you have given me?’ No operation commander would be willing to proceed without clear answers from the political level to all these questions (and more).
We can infer the answers by looking at the results of the IDF operations in Gaza. It is becoming increasingly clear that every male Hamas operative, whether fighter or supporter, is regarded as a legitimate target. Legally and ethically I believe this is justifiable. What is not justifiable, in my view, is the level of civilian casualties Israel regards as acceptable consequent casualties or deaths. When used in a densely populated area, 155mm shells and bombs (whether dumb or smart) when used in huge numbers, even if precisely targeted, create a level of destruction that I find disproportionate, especially if the target is no more than a foot soldier.
Winston Churchill once said ’However beautiful the strategy is, you do occasionally have to look at the results’. The Israeli strategy to destroy Hamas is fine, but the results are certainly not. The destruction of the health, education and critical services infrastructure of Gaza is near total. Famine and disease are now a serious issue, as is the growing lack of proper living accommodation and sanitation. As I implied earlier, although the IDF is taking the flak for this, the greater responsibility lies at the political level.
But criticism of the IDF must be tempered by 2 important facts. The first is that Hamas has embedded itself deeply into the civilian infrastructure and population of Gaza, using the citizens it purports to govern as human shields and using schools and hospitals as cover for its activities. The second fact is that Hamas has so far refused to release all the hostages it captured on October 7. This shameful fact is probably the single biggest obstacle to a cease fire.
The IDF is waging a uniquely difficult urban war. In addition to the normal extreme ethical and practical difficulties of urban warfare have been added the callous use of civilians as human shields and an extensive underground tunnel network of 600-700 kilometres. There has never been a battlefield like this.
And will the Israeli military operation lead to the destruction of Hamas? Perhaps it will lead to the destruction of Hamas as an organisation in the short to medium term. But will it destroy Hamas as an ideology which is profoundly anti Israel and anti Israeli? The jury is out, but a generation of children who have been exposed to six months of shelling, displacement, death and injury are unlikely to grow up as friends of the Jewish state.
Even if we assume that Israel does destroy Hamas and the hostages are released, what happens then? The lesson of Iraq after the 2003 invasion is clear; an ungoverned space will produce outcomes that can be far from those intended or desired. So who will govern Gaza when the fighting stops? Who will rebuild its shattered infrastructure and the
traumatised minds of its citizens? (And who will do the same for the thousands of IDF reservists plucked from colleges and civilian jobs to be deployed into the hell of urban warfare?)
The absence of a post bellum political strategy and end state is glaringly obvious. The protagonists in this war, and indeed much of the rest of the world, are transfixed by the day to day actuality of conflict. By now it would have been reasonable to expect the emergence of some feasible plan for the ‘day after’.
By their recent actions, neither Hamas nor Israel have done anything substantive to resolve the Palestinian question, but both sides have hardened their attitudes towards the other, making an era of peace in the post bellum era much less likely.
About the author: Air Commodore (retd.) John Thomas served for over 30 years in the UK Royal Air Force, specialising in international relations at the political/military level. His main military ethics interests are the impact of good leadership on ethical behaviour and ethical decision making at the strategic level.